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ROUND TABLE

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WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME

A Radio Discussion by S. H. NERLOVE
FLOYD REEVES *and* RALPH TYLER

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Including
A Special Supplement on Demobilization and Readjustment

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Around the Round Table . . . .

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FLOYD W. REEVES, professor of administration in the Department of Education of the University of Chicago, served as chairman of the National Resources Planning Board's Conference on Post-war Readjustment of Civilian and Military Personnel, the report of which President Roosevelt recently released to the nation. Professor Reeves has served in many other capacities for the government, among which are: as director of personnel for the Tennessee Valley Authority, director of labor supply and training for the Office of Production Management, a member of the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, and as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Works Progress Administration. Professor Reeves attended Huron College (South Dakota) and received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago. Before coming to the University of Chicago, he taught at the University of Kentucky. He is a director of the American Youth Commission and served as chairman of the Advisory Committee on Education. He is the author of *The Political Unit of Public School Finance in Illinois* (1924); *College Organization and Administration* (with John D. Russell) (1929); *The Liberal Arts College* (with same) (1932); *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service* (with Paul David) (1937); *Adult Education* (with T. Fansler and C. O. Houle) (1938); and is the editor of the twelve-volume "University of Chicago Survey" and is co-author of ten of the volumes.

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WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME

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MR. TYLER: Today we are discussing a question of great importance and of great interest not only to men and women in the armed forces but to their families and the American people generally. The six-point demobilization proposal in President Roosevelt's recent radio address inspired the ROUND TABLE to discuss the problems which will arise when Johnny comes marching home.

MR. NERLOVE: It should be noted that the President referred explicitly only to the armed forces—a group which will be in the neighborhood of eleven million. What were these explicit references to the demobilization of the armed forces?

MR. REEVES: The President made six specific recommendations: mustering-out pay for those demobilized, unemployment insurance, a program of education and training, hospitalization and rehabilitation to those injured, old age benefits, and pensions.[1]

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[1] President Roosevelt's radio speech of July 28, 1943, included the following: ". . . . Among many other things, we are, today, laying plans for the return to civilian life of our gallant men and women in the armed services. They must not be demobilized into an environment of inflation and unemployment, to a place on a bread line or on a corner selling apples. We must, this time, have plans ready—instead of waiting to do a hasty, inefficient, and ill-considered job at the last moment.

"I have assured our men in the armed forces that the American people would not let them down when the war is won.

"I hope that the Congress will help in carrying out this assurance, for obviously the executive branch of the government cannot do it alone. . . . . Of course, the returning soldier and sailor and marine are a part of the problem of demobilizing the rest of the millions of Americans who have been working and living in a war economy since 1941. . . . . But the members of the armed forces have been

MR. TYLER: The President's proposal was based on a report from a Conference on Demobilization and Readjustment, set up by the National Resources Planning Board, of which you, Reeves, served as chairman. We are delighted, therefore, that you are to be with us this afternoon. We are also glad that you, Nerlove, as an economist, can be with us to analyze the problem.[2]

MR. NERLOVE: It should be noted, of course, that this report

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compelled to make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us and are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems. . . . . The least to which they are entitled, it seems to me, is something like this:

"1. Mustering-out pay to every member of the armed forces and merchant marine when he or she is honorably discharged, large enough in each case to cover a reasonable period of time between his discharge and the finding of a new job.

"2. In case no job is found after diligent search, then unemployment insurance if the individual registers with the United States Employment Service.

"3. An opportunity for members of the armed services to get further education or trade training at the cost of their government.

"4. Allowance of credit to all members of the armed forces, under unemployment compensation and Federal Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance, for their period of service. For these purposes they should be treated as if they had continued their employment in private industry.

"5. Improved and liberalized provisions for hospitalization, rehabilitation and medical care of disabled members of the armed forces and merchant marine.

"6. Sufficient pensions for disabled members of the armed forces."

[2] Professor Reeves was chairman of the Conference on Post-war Readjustment of Civilian and Military Personnel, which was set up by the National Resources Planning Board. The report of this Conference was released by the President on July 30, 1943. The report contained ninety-six recommendations for a program of demobilization and readjustment. Certain portions of these recommendations are reprinted in the supplement to this transcript and are to be found on pages 18–20. This report is available in pamphlet form from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C., under the title of *Demobilization and Readjustment*, June, 1943.

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covered a good deal more than merely the demobilization of the armed forces, because, in reality, the problem of demobilization is dependent upon what happens to American industry when it is converted from peacetime pursuits to wartime pursuits. In other words, what happens to the demobilized forces depends upon what happens to the civilian workers, and what happens to the civilian workers depends upon what happens to the Johnnies who are in the Army. Reeves, what is the picture on the entire situation?

MR. REEVES: I would like to go back just a moment to the situation as it was in the beginning of 1940. At that time we had about forty-five million people at work, and there were eight or nine million who were unemployed. By the end of this year, it has been estimated, we are going to have sixty-two million at work, if we include those in the armed forces. That means that we have added about seventeen million people to the working force in a period of four years—an average of more than four million a year.

As we look ahead to the period following the termination of the war, it has been estimated that the labor force of the nation, after the readjustment gets under way, will be about fifty-seven or fifty-eight million. That means that, since we had only forty-five million employed in 1940, we are going to have to find jobs for somewhere between twelve and thirteen million more people than there were at work in 1940.[3]

MR. TYLER: Does your analysis, Nerlove, as an economist, agree with this picture?

MR. NERLOVE: I do not know what these twelve to thirteen million mean with reference to unemployment in the immediate postwar period. What do they mean?

MR. REEVES: The Conference on Demobilization and Readjustment, the report of which the President released following his radio address, provided figures indicating that there might be as many as

[3] See page 23 for chart on the nation's labor force.

eight or nine million unemployed six months after the termination of the war.[4]

MR. TYLER: Do you think, Nerlove, that that is too large a figure?

MR. NERLOVE: I think that it is possible to take a much more optimistic view of the entire situation.

In the first place, the government will probably have difficulty in reducing war expenditures as drastically as the figures that Reeves gave imply.[5] Projects almost complete simply cannot be terminated in midair. After all, the government now is obligated to the extent of two hundred billion dollars in commitments. In addition to that, we are probably going to maintain, or even increase, our Lend-Lease expenditures, which are now running at approximately twelve billion. During the last war we had a great deal of difficulty in getting out of war expenditures.

Furthermore, I think it should be noted that the rate of demobilization implied in the figures just given might be slower than those figures indicate.

MR. TYLER: Of course, the parents of the boys overseas will want them to be demobilized as rapidly as possible.

MR. NERLOVE: There is no question about that, but it must be remembered that this is a global war and that it will be difficult to demobilize as rapidly as even those figures in the Conference Report on Demobilization and Readjustment, which the President released, indicate.

MR. TYLER: Are there other reasons why you think the unemployment will not be so great as eight or nine million?

MR. NERLOVE: There are at least three other important reasons.

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[4] See note 2 on page 2.

[5] On July 31, 1943, President Roosevelt reported in a summation of the state of the budget for the fiscal year 1944 that spending for the war, at the present time, is at the rate of $7,700,000,000 a month or 90 billion dollars annually.

It should be noted that there are significant areas in industry in which, without much technological interference, we could reemploy substantial numbers of people.

MR. TYLER: But won't these draw workers from other employed areas rather than using workers that might otherwise be unemployed?

MR. NERLOVE: I do not believe so, because they are in agriculture, trade, finance, service, and self-employment as well as in construction. Furthermore, I think we should take account of the fact that the plans of private industry, coupled with the idle capacity that now exists in small plants, will be available for peacetime pursuits within a relatively short period of time. I think that we should always remember that two-thirds of the money in banks, as indicated by a recent study by the Federal Reserve Board, is in the hands of business, ready to finance the conversion to peacetime industry.

MR. REEVES: I wish that I could be as optimistic as you seem to be with reference to the amount of unemployment. I recognize the fact that there will be an accumulated demand for consumers' goods, that a great many people are going to have a lot of money to spend for consumers' goods, and all these points that you raised, but at the same time we have to recognize how rapidly these men and women are going to be demobilized from our war industries.

In this report of the conference that was referred to a moment ago, it was indicated that at the end of three months there would be between six and seven million unemployed; at the end of six months there might be between eight and nine million. That was not a specific forecast; it was merely an indication of what we had some reason to expect.

MR. TYLER: But I am not clear from Nerlove's statement whether he believes there will be any unemployment at all.

MR. NERLOVE: Oh, I believe that there will be unemployment, but the upshot of taking account of the five points that I made, as

well as others that could have been made in this connection, indicates clearly that perhaps four to five million is all that we might expect during the first year of demobilization.

MR. TYLER: Whether it is five million or more than eight million, it is still a serious and substantial amount of unemployment during the first year after victory. What shall we do about it? Shall we rely on private industry?

It seems to me that we may now turn to the second question for discussion this afternoon and consider what can be done about unemployment.

MR. REEVES: I think that we ought to rely on private industry, of course, a great deal, but I do not believe that that alone is going to be enough. What do you think, Nerlove?

MR. NERLOVE: If one is going to be very pessimistic about the unemployment, one is likely to make it desirable for government to step in and make large direct expenditures, whereas if one is likely to be more optimistic about the unemployment in the post-war period, one will put emphasis on post-war plans that will concentrate on facilitating industry and the labor force in moving into peacetime pursuits.

MR. TYLER: But that is quite a different thing, isn't it? What can be done to facilitate private industry?

MR. NERLOVE: We could, for example, set plans now for a readjustment of business taxes so that they would stimulate investment.

Secondly, we could continue the control of interest rates so that they will be low and, thereby, induce investment into various kinds of plants and equipment. We must recognize that the rate of return of investment, as compared to the interest rate, is the important factor in determining how large the funds will be that flow into investment. Furthermore, we might develop a plan for orderly cancellation of contracts, and we might also help finance small businesses, so that they will have sufficient working capital to convert to peacetime activity.

MR. TYLER: Reeves, do you accept Nerlove's proposal? Do you think that there is no need for a program of government works?

MR. REEVES: I certainly do not accept his proposal. I do agree with him substantially in the points he made with reference to what private industry can do if it is properly aided. Nevertheless, I do not think that that is going to take care of the whole problem. This thing will come on us too fast. I am confident in my own mind that we will be making a serious mistake if we are not ready to have a substantial public works program, financed by government, to supplement what private industry can do in this situation.

MR. NERLOVE: It should be noted, of course, that the extent of the mistake will depend upon the amount of unemployment—the less the unemployment, the less serious the mistake. Of course, it will not hurt to have a public works program, but it may be important to emphasize the fact that we should have the other type of programs developed as well and as thoroughly as a public works program.

MR. REEVES: I agree entirely with you on that. We certainly should have the other type of program developed. But I do not like the way you put it—that "it will not hurt to have a public works program." I think that it is a basic essential that we have a very large shelf of public works all set to go. A thing like that can't be done overnight. We have to make our plans now. We are going to have to have a backlog of needed public works that is just about as great as the backlog of needed civilian goods when this war is over. By that I mean that we are going to have to have schoolhouses and houses for people to live in, and so on. Some of these will undoubtedly be part of the public works program. We are going to need roads; we are going to need river developments; we are going to need to improve our parks and our forests. These are all needed additions to the public wealth of this nation.

I am not talking about a program of what some people call "boondoggling." If we do our planning far enough in advance, we are not

going to have to have a program of boondoggling. However, if we fail to plan prior to the time that the war ends, then we may find ourselves with the necessity of having a program that we might call boondoggling.

MR. TYLER: But when Johnny comes marching home, will not he, and the other men in the service, feel that these are simply political expedients? Won't they look primarily to private industry for employment?

MR. REEVES: They are going to have to look primarily to private industry for employment. I am sure of that. Just the same, they are going to want jobs, and they have a right to those jobs. This nation has to do everything it can to provide them those jobs.

MR. NERLOVE: There is no doubt about the fact that the nation should do all it can to provide the jobs. It is just a question of emphasis. Are we going to facilitate private industry to get into the swim of things and reconvert and reemploy, or are we going to spend a considerable amount of time in developing a large and grand public works program?

MR. REEVES: I do not think that it is an "either-or" matter at all. We are probably going to do both of these things. I hope that we are going to do everything we can to stimulate private industry, and I also hope that we are going to have an adequate shelf of public works ready to go in order to take up the slack that private industry alone cannot take up.

MR. TYLER: I am not clear about the number of men who could be employed by any such public works program. How many do you estimate could be employed in construction work?[6]

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[6] The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 1.8 million people in the construction industry in 1940; 1.9 million in 1941; and 1.7 million in 1942. It is estimated that there will be about 600,000 such workers in 1943 and 1944. Assuming victory in December, 1944, the Bureau forecasts a possible 1.8 million construction workers in 1945 and 2.2 million in 1946.

MR. NERLOVE: In private and public construction, within a year, there might well be employed some one and a half to two million people. Of course, that means a spread of purchasing power and repercussions on increased employment in the rest of industry.

MR. REEVES: I think that your figures are all right with reference to the construction program. If we plan the blueprint stage in advance, we can employ as many as you say in the construction program. I do want to point out, however, that that is not the only type of public works that has value. There are some public works that we might call "short-range" public works that are also valuable. They are not boondoggling. I think of soil conservation as one type and of the repair of public buildings. We know that there is going to be a great need for repairing public buildings when the war is over, because we are not doing very much of that now.

MR. TYLER: But you are assuming, are you not, that the war will end all at once and that we will have to have a big program at that time? Suppose the war ends in stages—the European war ending first, and later the war in Asia?

MR. REEVES: I can see where it might make quite a lot of difference with reference to the amount of unemployment we have if the war in Europe should end at one stage and the war in Asia should end, say, nine months, or a year, later. But, assuming that the war in Europe ends and that the war in the Pacific goes on two or three years longer, my best guess would be that, in a situation of that kind, this nation is going to have to make just as great an effort to win that war as it would if we were fighting on both fronts.

MR. NERLOVE: Taking out that last assumption, I think that you would agree, would you not, Reeves, that if we can beat Japan within six or nine months after the finish in Europe, your unemployment figures are relatively high and that mine come closer to being the correct estimates?

MR. REEVES: I would agree on that point, Nerlove.

MR. TYLER: I think that that is not the most important matter in any event. As far as this second topic—what to do about unemployment—is concerned, we do seem to be agreed that we need a combination of private industry and public works to solve the unemployment problem. But, in any event, we shall need some kind of cushioning device to take care of the men during the period of readjustment.

Let us turn for our third area of discussion to the question of what kind of cushioning devices might be provided. What do you think, Reeves?

MR. REEVES: When Johnny comes marching home, he is not going to want to come home to unemployment or relief or selling apples on the street. He is going to want to come home to a job.

MR. TYLER: How about the civilian?

MR. REEVES: If he has no job, then he, too, is not going to be satisfied to be on relief. With reference to the civilian, I think that many people have not taken seriously enough the difficulties that civilians are going to face when the war terminates. We must remember that we have engaged in war work almost twice as many civilians as we have people in our armed forces and that that is where the greatest unemployment is going to come the most rapidly following the end of the war.[7]

MR. TYLER: What device can be used to cushion the problem for them?

MR. REEVES: The Conference reporting to the President on demobilization and readjustment emphasized particularly two devices to cushion the unemployment for civilians—that is, after these other things we have been talking about have been done.

First, it recommended unemployment compensation. It recognized the fact that we now have unemployment compensation for

[7] It is estimated that for December, 1943, there will be about 19 million civilians in war work and 10.8 million in the armed services.

many of our civilians but that there are millions of them who are not now covered and that there are millions of them who do receive unemployment compensation that do not receive amounts that are large enough. Therefore, the Conference recommended that we have a national—a federal—program of unemployment compensation instead of the federal-state program that we now have and that we increase the coverage by enlarging the number of people who get compensation. It recommended that we increase the benefits in many states.

MR. TYLER: What was the second point?

MR. REEVES: The second point related to old age assistance. There, again, we have a situation where we now have provisions to help elderly people retire from the labor market, but they are not adequate provisions. In some states they are particularly inadequate, and so the Conference recommended that we increase the amount of the benefits in most states and that we increase the coverage. It was a general consensus among the members of the Conference that that was one of the most important things that could be done to take people off the labor market.

MR. NERLOVE: That is all very good, and I think that we ought to cushion the transition period from demobilization to full employment with reference to the war workers. In addition to that, however, it might be worth while to consider the paying of a dismissal wage on the part of industry. The immediate advantages that I see in this is that it would stimulate industry to convert more rapidly to peacetime pursuits than otherwise might be the case. Furthermore, it would increase the mobility of wage-earners, because it would give them a fund with which to move from one area to another. Of course, if we follow through on the Conference report, it indicates clearly that there is going to be a great migration problem.

MR. TYLER: But the subject for the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE this afternoon is "When Johnny Comes Marching

Home." Let us consider the problem of the military men. What would you do about them?

MR. NERLOVE: Of course, the President suggested mustering-out pay, and he apparently based it on the Conference report. That report indicated that we ought to pay somewhere in the neighborhood of a hundred dollars a month for three months, and some additional benefits, to all men discharged from the armed forces.

MR. TYLER: What would that cost?

MR. NERLOVE: I would predict offhand that that would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of two billion dollars during the first year, if we accept the figures presented in the report of the Conference on Demobilization and Readjustment which the President released.

MR. TYLER: Reeves, what other recommendations would you make?

MR. REEVES: The Conference pointed out that those to be demobilized from the armed forces already have job preference under the present Selective Service Act. It also pointed out that, while employers are required to hire men back in their former jobs, if those jobs still exist, and while they are required to give them a job that is comparable if the job they had is gone, at the same time there will be several million of these men who never had any job to which they can return. Some of them were in school, and others were employed in war industries that will be demobilized at the termination of the war. Thus there is undoubtedly going to be a considerable percentage of those who will be demobilized from the armed services who have no job to go back to.

The Conference report also recognized the fact that our present social security laws do not provide fairly for the members of the armed forces. For example, they are not now in a position in the Army or in the Navy to be building up reserves. It therefore recommended that social security benefits comparable to those that

civilians get when they hold jobs be made available to members of the armed forces.

MR. NERLOVE: All in all, it looks as if we ought to support these cushioning devices suggested by the President, because, after all, we are dealing with human beings. We must take care of the men and women demobilized from the armed services as well as the workers who have been discharged from war work after the end of the war.

The mustering-out pay seems reasonable enough. The unemployment insurance suggestion for the armed services, indicating a ceiling of twenty-six weeks, might be made longer. Perhaps we ought not to have a ceiling at all, because we ought to take care of unemployed workers if the amount of unemployment is very serious.

The result of all that would be to help maintain full income, full employment income, and, therefore, it would not have a very serious inflation threat.

MR. TYLER: We have not mentioned one step that not only is a cushioning device but has long-range effects—the provision of education and training. This proposal has received much discussion in the press. What did your Conference recommend, Reeves?

MR. REEVES: The Conference made a number of recommendations with reference to providing education for those demobilized from the armed services.

In the first place, it recognized that there will probably be several million youth who will have dropped out of school before they finished the education that they would have had if there had been no war. So it recommended that a program of education, including both general education and technical or vocational education, be made available for every member of the armed forces who wants it, up to a period of one year in length. By "being made available," the Conference meant that it would be provided free to the youth and that that youth would be provided with an allowance for maintenance during the period of time that he takes that education.

MR. TYLER: The one year is not enough, is it, for some of the men?

MR. REEVES: No, it is not enough for some of the men. That is where the second plan comes in. It is undoubtedly true that this dropping-out-of-school in such large numbers that has been going on during the last two or three years is going to result in a very great shortage of trained people in some of the professions and in some technical occupations. Thus the Conference recommended that there be set up a program that would be up to four years in length—that is, four calendar years within a six-year period from the time the youth is demobilized. This plan would be placed on a competitive basis—that is, those who are best qualified to benefit by that education would be given the opportunity to get both vocational and general education.

MR. NERLOVE: Gentlemen, I seem to have become lost here. I thought that we were talking about demobilization and readjustment. I did not think that we were talking about a big, broad educational program that will take many years, and so forth.

MR. TYLER: I do not think one can distinguish between education and training, on the one hand, and readjustment, on the other. It seems to me quite clear that, when we speak of education and training, we are talking about two different things. "Training" is the term we use to describe the process of getting a man ready for a particular job. "Education," on the other hand, provides him with a much broader background. It prepares him to utilize his mind and his abilities more broadly; to understand the world in which he lives; and to serve as an intelligent citizen should serve. Both of those things relate to the problem of readjustment in two ways. They provide, on the one hand, for the time of some of the men who might otherwise be unemployed. In the second place, they provide for the improvement both of our labor force and of the quality of our citizens.

MR. NERLOVE: Tyler, how many do you estimate would go into

this educational program if we properly developed it and implemented it?

MR. TYLER: The best estimate that I can make is that about seven hundred thousand men would want to take a program of education at the junior college or senior college level and that probably two to three million more would get a program of training for at least a year.

MR. REEVES: I do not think that there is any way to tell exactly or even approximately what that number is going to be, because it is going to depend so largely on how much unemployment we actually do have and also upon whether the federal government makes the provisions that we have been talking about.

MR. NERLOVE: But it would reduce the labor force, wouldn't it, from the fifty-seven million that we were discussing at the beginning of the session here?

MR. REEVES: It would reduce it in terms of the Conference; yes, that is correct.

MR. TYLER: I think that we can summarize our discussion this afternoon in this way:

We seem to be agreed that there is a serious problem of unemployment facing us when victory is won. We are also agreed that to provide for that unemployment will require the action both of private industry and of government. We seem to be agreed, too, that, during a period in which private industry is being reconverted, there will be need for various devices to cushion the unemployment problem for individuals.

We have talked about such devices as unemployment compensation, old age assistance, private industry's giving dismissal wages, mustering-out pay for men in the service, job preference for men in the service, and legislation to provide social security for men who have been in the service.

We have also talked about education and training. It seems that

we are generally agreed that education and training are closely related to the problems of unemployment. They provide, on the one hand, a means of giving important work and activity to many men who are in the service or who have been in war work. In the second place, they provide an opportunity to upgrade the quality of our labor and to improve the quality of our citizenship. For these reasons, they have a place in the picture.

In a subsequent broadcast the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE will discuss, in greater detail, the kind of education and training that ought to be provided for men when the war is over.

The ROUND TABLE, *oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the* ROUND TABLE *speakers.*

A Special Supplement on Demobilization and Readjustment

THEIR ROAD BACK!

Jerry Doyle cartoon reprinted with special permission of the *Philadelphia Record*.

POST-WAR DEMOBILIZATION AND READJUSTMENT REPORT by the National Resources Planning Board's Conference on Post-war Readjustment of Civilian and Military Personnel, June, 1943

A Selection, from the Complete Ninety-six Point Program, of Recommendations Relating to Education and Employment

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4. Industrial demobilization—the release of men from war industries and their relocation and re-employment—should be carried out in such a way as not to dissipate and deplete the professional, technical, and labor personnel required for the preservation of the essential industries in such state as national need and policy may dictate.

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5. A general policy of speedy, but orderly and controlled, military demobilization should be adopted, coupled with the use of all reasonable plans and measures to increase the employment available.

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9. It should be a vital part of the program to encourage the conversion and development of private industry and business, including the provision of favorable conditions for private capital formation and the expansion of private enterprise.

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12. The following types of educational services should be provided:

For servicemen desiring to resume industrial or other employment, a program of vocational and job training designed to prepare them to re-enter their old jobs or occupations or to find appropriate employment in new ones.

A program which will permit young ex-servicemen whose education on this account has been interrupted to resume their education and will afford equal opportunity for the education of other young ex-servicemen of ability following demobilization.

The provision of training and educational opportunities for men in foreign service and particularly for those who may for any reason be waiting for repatriation or demobilization.

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15. As a policy, all training and educational programs for men in the armed services prior to their release from active military duty should be carried out under the direction of the services.

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16. Training and educational programs for those who have been demobilized should be subject to the direction of civilian authority and carried out by the regularly constituted educational institutions.

25. Those in service or in training who are properly qualified and who desire to serve abroad should have an opportunity. They should be used to replace troops in foreign service, so the latter may be demobilized.

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29. Servicemen whose service has been especially arduous either in length or in character should be demobilized first.

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30. Domestic status.—The following order of precedence in demobilization is recommended: (1) married with dependents; (2) married without dependents; (3) unmarried with dependents; (4) unmarried without dependents.

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31. Occupation.—It is particularly important in certain fields that those individuals in the armed forces who are in a position to organize enterprises leading to employment be released early.

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43. Separation pay.—The separation pay that men receive during the period of "furlough" should be full base pay including full family allowances. However, in cases where the base pay, exclusive of family allowances, would be in excess of $100 per month, this sum should be accepted as the base pay.

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46. At the expiration of the three-month "furlough" period, men should become eligible for veterans' unemployment benefits, provided they register for employment with the appropriate office of the Employment Service.

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47. Unemployment benefits should be paid to eligible ex-servicemen at a uniform rate at any time that they are unemployed within the next twelve months, provided the total of such payments should not exceed the equivalent of full benefit payments for twenty-six weeks.

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51. At any time during the three-month period of "furlough," or the ensuing twelve months, men should be allowed to elect to enter upon a program of training or education.

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53. Both general and vocational or professional education and training should be provided, but not in those fields in which the supply of trained personnel is already large enough to meet anticipated demands.

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54. Training and education under the general plan should begin at whatever level is appropriate for the individual concerned. The duration should not exceed one year.

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55. A consultation service should be provided to advise, guide, and direct men to their courses of study.

58. Those eligible for training under this plan should receive free tuition and reasonable but modest allowances for maintenance of such a character as will not serve to restrain them from accepting employment.

59. The plan should be supplemented by provisions for more extended opportunities in the fields of higher education.

60. Any persons who are judged eligible for discharge and have served in the armed forces for at least ninety days, should be eligible to apply for such supplementary education. Selection should be on a competitive basis.

61. Supplementary education should be under a system of scholarships carrying reasonable maintenance allowances.

65. Any course of supplementary education provided to an individual should not exceed a four-year period, including any education provided under the general plan. All courses of education should be accomplished within a period of six years of termination of the war.

66. Continuation of the student in his program should depend on his academic and general progress.

74. Unemployment compensation coverage should be extended to include the maximum number of workers, and in most states the benefit payments should be extended upward to cover subsistence needs more nearly.

76. Coverage of Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance should be extended to include the maximum number of workers.

77. The federal government should assist in providing an extension of education services for workers displaced from employment because of demobilization and the termination of war contracts to equip them for employment in peacetime industry.

81. Opportunities for agricultural employment should be called to the attention of discharged servicemen and of war industry workers, and those qualified to operate and desiring to buy farms from retiring operators should receive assistance from the appropriate government agency.

82. It should be a cardinal principle that agriculture shall not be looked upon as the dumping ground for the industrial unemployed.

84. Those who have been displaced from their farms by acquisition of land for Army or Navy use should have a first opportunity to buy farms to be established out of this land. The next priority in these rights should be given to men being demobilized, and they should be employed in connection with the erection of farm structures, etc.

WILL JOHNNY COME HOME TO THIS?



FREE SCHOOLS FOR ALL?



Figures are in millions of dollars. Post-war estimates are based on 1940 purchasing power.

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WAR SHIFTS IN THE LABOR FORCE



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

SHIFTS IN LABOR FORCE FROM WAR'S PEAK TO PEACE



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MANPOWER TO BE DEMOBILIZED

Source: *Survey Graphic*, May, 1943

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Gross national product is the sum of all expenditures of government at all levels, civilian expenditures for consumers' goods, and gross private capital expenditures. The 1943 figures are estimates.

WHAT DO YOU *Expect* AFTER THE WAR?



Source: National Opinion Research Center poll of April, 1943

INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION

BY STATES



Reprinted with special permission of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The key is based on military plus industrial demobilization, figured as a percentage of pre-war (1940) employment.

EMPLOYMENT IN POST-WAR AMERICA


REMAINING IN ARMED SERVICES AND SUPPORTING WAR INDUSTRY
REMAINING IN WAR INDUSTRIES FOR LEND-LEASE FOOD AND SUPPLIES
DEMOBILIZED FROM WAR TO WORK
FROM ARMED FORCES (with prior claim on jobs)
FROM WAR INDUSTRIES
CIVILIAN GOODS & SERVICES
REMAINING IN CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
WOMEN & OTHERS LEAVING JOB FRONT ALTOGETHER
FURTHER EDUCATION
HOUSING
PUBLIC WORKS AND SERVICES
UNEMPLOYMENT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE PICTOGRAPH BY Harold Haydon

EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS ONE MILLION WORKERS

Source: Stuart Chase, "Man Is a Working Animal," *Survey Graphic*, May, 1943.

What Do *You* Think?

1. What do you think of the six-point military demobilization program presented by President Roosevelt? What are the arguments for and against a bonus?

2. In your opinion how rapid should the demobilization of the armed forces be? Assuming that there are four or five million civilians unemployed, should a soldier be demobilized if there is no job waiting for him? What general principles should apply to the problem of who should be demobilized first?

3. Do you think that there will be considerable amounts of unemployment within the first two years after the termination of the war? How much unemployment would you regard as "normal"? Would you be in favor of accepting a condition of millions unemployed as part of the price of the war turmoil, or would you favor the expansion of public works to make work available to all those who want it?

4. How far do you think that business itself can and should assume the responsibility to maintain a high level of production and employment after the war? In what ways can the government encourage private industry to provide jobs? What changes in prewar policies of government toward business do you think should be made to facilitate this end?

5. What should be done to help complete the education and training of those whose schooling has been interrupted by the war? Do you favor the recommendations made in the National Resources Planning Board report of demobilization and readjustment? Should the cost of such a program be regarded as part of the cost of the war? What kind of education should be provided for what groups and in what amount?

6. Should the provisions of the Social Security Act be extended to include all those in the armed forces? Should unemployment insurance be extended for a period longer than twenty-six weeks for those mustered out of the armed services?

7. Do you think that the post-war demand for consumer goods will insure prosperity equal to the present war boom in terms of employment? If another major depression appears and unemployment feeds upon itself and becomes prevalent, what do you think the American people will be likely to do?

More on This Topic

"From War to Work: How To Get Full Employment and Keep It Going," *Survey Graphic*, May, 1943. *Seventeen articles by authorities on business, labor, social security, and finance.*

GRAY, CARL A., "We Can Train Soldiers for Postwar Jobs," *Saturday Evening Post*, August 7, 1943. *Suggests a plan to put the men in the armed services back to work after the war is over.*

HANSEN, ALVIN H., "Wanted: Ten Million Jobs," *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1943. *A discussion of World War I demobilization and a summary of facts and figures on full employment.*

HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. (ed.), *Postwar Economic Problems.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1943. *Twenty-three articles by prominent economists on the problems of full employment, capitalism, economic policy, fiscal policy, agriculture, and post-war price controls.*

HINRICHS, A. F., "D-Day and the Change-Over," *Survey Graphic*, May, 1943. *Discusses what "Demobilization Day" and the conversion of plants and agencies to a peacetime status will mean to American communities and workers. Argues that we must prepare now for the "months of movement" after the war ends.*

HOFFMAN, PAUL G., "Will You Get Your Job Back?" *American Magazine*, September, 1943. *Says that private enterprise, given the opportunity, can maintain full employment.*

"Jobs for Veterans," *Life*, August 9, 1943.

"Our Servicemen and Economic Security," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1943. *A series of twenty-two articles on adjustment of personnel upon their entry into the service and their readjustment upon termination of service.*

STEWART, MAXWELL S., *Jobs and Security for Tomorrow.* "Public Affairs Pamphlets," No. 84. New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1943. *A summary of the National Resources Planning Board reports on social security, public works, and government relief policies.*

ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 119 STATIONS

2:00 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350

1:00 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
			Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
[illegible] Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
[illegible] Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
	WMFG	1240	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
	KPRC	950	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
	WIRE	1430	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
	[illegible]DAF	610	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
		1400	Virginia, Minn.	WH[illegible]B	1400
			[illegible]	K[illegible]	

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ROUND TABLE
BROADCAST





the
ROUND TABLE
TRANSCRIPT

regularly for discussions by the expe

SUBSCR